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Blocking Eco-Patent Trolls: Using Federalism to Foster Innovation In 
Environmental Technology 
Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Patent trolls,”1 also known as non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), is a 
term used to denote any entity that asserts patent rights based on a patent it 
owns but does not practice.
2
 Over the past decade, the rise of patent trolls has 
significantly impacted the patent ecosystem. NPE-related litigation has 
become a significant percentage of all patent lawsuits filed.
3
 The number and 
costs of NPE patent assertions are also increasing,
4
 and their targets are 
                                                 
1
 The term “patent troll“ was coined in 2001 by the Assistant General Counsel for Intel, 
Peter Detkin, when he was defending Intel in infringement suits that were necessitated by 
these patent trolls. M. Qaiser & P. Mohan Chandran, Patent Terrorism--Terror of the 
Intangibles, ENTERPRISE IP (June 27, 2006), http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/ 
article.asp?id=11605&deptid=3.  See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual 
Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 105 (2012) 
(noting “patent trolls“ are sometimes termed “patent extortionists,“ “patent sharks,“ “patent 
terrorists,“ “patent pirates,“ or basically, the word “patent“ combined with any pejorative 
noun.). But see Terrence P. McMahon, Stephen J. Akerley, Jane H. Bu, Who Is A Troll? Not 
A Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159 (2006) (discussing the history and development of 
the term, as well as the difficulty of defining “patent trolls“); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents 
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 961, 1023 (2005) (“[A]ny 
effort to design a suitable definition of the term ‘troll’ is likely to lend credence to the view 
that the status as a troll is in the eye of the beholder.“). See gen. Todd Klein, Ebay v. 
Mercexchange and Ksr Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Wages War Against 
Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 314 (2007). 
2
 Joel B. Cartera, Responding to a Patent Troll’s Threats, 48 ARK. LAW. 30 (Summer 
2013). 
3
See James E. Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. ___ (Forthcoming 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091210. In 2011, 
2,150 unique companies were forced to mount 5,842 defenses in lawsuits initiated by the 
actions of NPEs, as compared to 2005, in which the number of defenses was 1,401. Id. 
4
 Id.  (estimating that the direct costs of NPE patent assertions totaled about $29 billion 
in 2011, up from $7 billion in 2005). 
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 In response, both the United States Supreme Court and 
the Federal Circuit have taken steps to control NPE-related litigation in a 
series of decisions.
6
  The Forrester decision represents the Federal Circuit’s 
latest attempt to reduce NPEs’ negative effects on the judiciary, and to open 
the door for state regulation of patent trolls. 
II.  FACTS & HOLDING 
In Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator 
Technologies, Inc.,
7
 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
addressed whether a past statement made outside the U.S.A. regarding a U.S. 
patent and limiting the conduct at issue to Taiwan, creates patent law issues 
which are “substantial in the relevant sense” to the case, thus creating subject 
matter jurisdiction for federal court jurisdiction. 
Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. and Keith E. Forrester 
(collectively “Forrester”) and Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. 
(“Wheelabrator”) are competitors in the market for phosphate-based 
treatment systems for stabilizing heavy metals in municipal and industrial 
waste.
8
  These treatments prevent heavy metals from potentially leaching into 
sources of drinking water.
9
  Wheelabrator calls its treatment system “WES-
                                                 
5
 Id.  Bessen and Meurer’s data shows that small and medium-sized entities made up 
90% of the companies sued, accounted for 59% of the defenses, and paid about 37% of the 
aggregate costs in 2011. Id. (“Very many of these troll lawsuits are targeted against relatively 
small firms…We expected that most [of the lawsuits] would be against the big, highly 
recognized brands like Google, Cisco, IBM, Microsoft. It turns out that the majority of the 
targets are not such big firms.”).  
6
 Peter S. Menell et al., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE, §1.1.2.2 (2d ed. 
2012); Todd Klein, Ebay v. Mercexchange and Ksr Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme 
Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 314 (2007). 
7
 715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
8
 Id. at 1331. 
9
 Id. 
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PHix®” and Forrester calls its system “FESI-BOND.”10  Each owns U.S. 
patents on their respective waste treatment systems.
11
 
Wheelabrator and Kobin had a mutual Taiwanese customer, Kobin 
Environmental Enterprise Co., Ltd. (“Kobin”).12  In 2001, Wheelabrator 
entered into a license agreement with a Taiwanese company called Bio Max 
Environmental Engineering (“Bio Max”).13  Bio Max then sublicensed WES-
PHix® to Kobin.
14
  In 2004, Forrester learned that Kobin was dissatisfied 
with the odor generated by the WES-PHix® system.
15
  In response, Forrester 
developed a variation on its FESI-BOND system to address the odor problem 
and persuaded Kobin to license FESI-BOND for use at Kobin’s Taipei 
plant.
16
  In 2006, Wheelabrator sent Kobin a letter asserting that Kobin was 
in breach of its WES-PHix® sublicense agreement for failure to pay 
royalties.
17
  After the letter, Kobin stopped purchasing from Forrester and 
entered into a new WES-PHix® sublicense with Wheelabrator, which
 
license 
defined WES-PHix® as “the patented ... and proprietary process of 
immobilization of metals, such as lead and cadmium, in solid residues ... 
using any solid, liquid or chemical form of phosphate and/or lime,”18 




 The Federal Circuit noted that Wheelabrator has obtained several related U.S. patents, 
including U.S. Patent Nos. 4,737,356 (“the ′356 patent”), 5,430,233 (“the ′233 patent“), and 












 Id. The letter stated that “Wheelabrator understands that Kobin is using a phosphate-
based process to treat municipal waste combustion ash ... at Kobin‘s [a]sh processing facility 
in Taiwan“ and that “[t]he Sublicense Agreement obligates Kobin to pay Bio Max or 
Wheelabrator ... for each tonne [sic] of [a]sh stabilized by phosphate at its [a]sh processing 
facility.“ Id. The letter also threatened legal action in Taiwan to enforce the sublicense 
agreement. Id. 
18
 Id. at 1332. 
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specifically referenced certain patents owned by Wheelabrator,
19
 and granted 
a license to utilize WES-PHix® under said patents in Taiwan.
20
 
In 2010, Forrester filed suit against Wheelabrator in New Hampshire 
state court, asserting four state law causes of action as a result of 
Wheelabrator’s actions regarding Kobin: violation of the New Hampshire 
Consumer Protection Act; tortious interference with a contractual 
relationship; tortious interference with Forrester’s prospective advantage; and 
trade secret misappropriation.
21
  Forrester alleged that Wheelabrator made 
false representations to Kobin about the scope of Wheelabrator’s patents, 
which led Kobin to believe Wheelabrator’s patents covered Forrester’s 
system, and caused Kobin to terminate its relationship with Forrester.
22
   
Wheelabrator removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Hampshire.
23
  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may 
remove to federal district court “any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.”24 
Forrester moved to remand the case to state court,
25
 arguing that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1338, which gives 
federal district courts original jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under 
any Act of Congress relating to patents.”26  Wheelabrator argued that the 
court had federal jurisdiction under Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corporation., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), because Forrester could only recover if it 
prevailed on a substantial question of U.S. patent law.
27
  The district court 
denied Forrester’s motion, and accepted jurisdiction.28  Proceeding with the 
                                                 
19
 U.S. Patents 4,737,356, 5,245,114, and 5,430,233. 
20
 Id. at 1332. The agreement did not explain how U.S. patents could be licensed for 
activities in Taiwan. Id. 
21
  Id. 
22
 Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1332 




 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  
25
 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1332. 
26
 28 U.S.C § 1338. 
27
 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1332.  
28
 Id.  
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, agreed 
with Forrester, holding removal was improper because the district court 
lacked original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
31
  The 
Federal Circuit reasoned that for a state law cause of action to qualify for 
jurisdiction under § 1338, it must “involve a patent law issue that is ‘(1) 
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of 
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance 
approved by Congress.’”32  The court held that the case did not raise a 
“substantial” issue of patent law because there was no prospect of future 
conflict between the parties and thus no prospect of inconsistent judgments 
between state and federal courts.
33
  Specifically, no prospect of future 
conflict existed because the process was being used in Taiwan and could not 
violate United States patents, and because the patents were expired.
34
 Thus, 
any potential conflict was purely “hypothetical.”35 Therefore, the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Forrester’s claims, and the 
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded to the 
district court with instructions to remand the case to New Hampshire state 
court.
36
  This holding makes it clear that when the conduct was purely in the 
past and does not raise a “substantial” question of federal patent law, federal 










 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
32
 Id.; Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 
(2013)). 
33
 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334. 
34
 Id. at 1334-1335. 
35
 Id. at 1335. 
36
 Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
37
Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013)); 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant intellectual 
property rights through patents, in order “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts . . . .”38  A patent is an exclusive property right that 
is generally granted for a period of 20 years.
39
  The purpose of the patent 
system is to promote innovation and disclosure of inventions while protecting 
the research investment of the individual or company.
40
  
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS INVOLVING PATENTS 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove to a federal 
district court “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.”41  Unlike state courts, 
a federal court’s jurisdiction is limited to that which Congress grants.42  
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction where diversity or a federal 
question exists.
43
  The general federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over all civil 
actions “arising under” the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.
44
  Separate provisions grant the district courts exclusive original 
jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction, over 
                                                 
38
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
39
 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, General Information 
Concerning Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/ (last modified Sept. 
9, 2008). 
40
 See Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to 
Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 3, 9-10 (1996). 
41
 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
42
 In re United States, 877 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
43
 See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1338; Air Measurement Techs., 504 F.3d at 
1266. 
44
 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1338. See Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 
640 (Tex. 2011) (“Congress has provided federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions 
generally ‘arising under’ federal law ....“), rev‘d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). See gen. Isaac C. 
Ta, Can Federal Courts Exercise Jurisdiction over State Law Malpractice Claims Arising 
Out of Patent Law Disputes?, 3 ST. MARY‘S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 344, 354 (2013). 
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cases arising under federal patent law.
45
  Specifically, 28 U.S.C § 1338(a) 
gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions brought 




STATE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS INVOLVING PATENTS 
Several courts have addressed the issue of state court jurisdiction in 
cases involving patent rights.
47
  Cases presenting only state law claims can 
still arise under federal law if the complaint raises “a significant federal 
issue.”48  However, the United States Supreme Court has held that state 
courts may adjudicate “patent questions” so long as the action does not “arise 
under” the patent laws.49 In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corporation, the Supreme Court held that a claim may “aris[e] under” the 
patent laws even where patent law did not create the cause of action, 
provided that the “well-pleaded complaint establishes . . . that the plaintiff’s 
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 
federal patent law.”50  Thus, even a cause of action created by state law may 
“aris[e] under” federal patent law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338 if 
it involves a patent law issue that is “(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually 
                                                 
45
 Id. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 19(a)-(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331-32 (2011). 
46
 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction over “any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents“). 
47
 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1791, 1810 (2013). 
48
 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). 
See also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (noting the 
creation test articulated by Justice Holmes in American Well Works “is more useful for 
inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended“). 
49
 See Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1888); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. 
v. Reichold Chems., Inc., 755 F.2d 1559, 1562, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 123 (Fed. Cir. 
1985); 167 A.L.R. 1114, 1118. See also A & C Eng‘g. Co. v. Atherholt, 355 Mich. 677, 95 
N.W.2d 871 (1959). 
50
 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988). 
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disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court 
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”51  
Pursuant to the constitutional intellectual property clause, patent law 
is entirely federal law.
52
  Unlike actions in patent law, legal malpractice is 
governed by state law.
53
  Professional malpractice claims are traditionally 




In 2007, the Federal Circuit asserted exclusive federal jurisdiction 
over patent-related malpractice claims in two decisions issued on the same 
day.
55
 In these two malpractice decisions, Air Measurement Technologies and 
Immunocept, the Federal Circuit held that disputed and substantial patent 
issues in state court patent malpractice claims are subject to exclusive federal 
court jurisdiction.
56
  Before the Supreme Court decided Gunn, the Federal 
                                                 
51
 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013). 
52
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
53
Isaac C. Ta, Can Federal Courts Exercise Jurisdiction over State Law Malpractice 
Claims Arising Out of Patent Law Disputes?, 3 ST. MARY‘S J. LEGAL MAL. &  ETHICS 344, 
354 (2013).  See also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1791, 1805 (2013) (stating “[t]he Federal Circuit had adopted this expansive 
view despite two prominent Supreme Court cases strongly suggesting that federal 
jurisdiction over a state-law claim requires a disputed question of federal law.“). See, e.g., 50 
State Survey of Legal Malpractice Law, A.B.A., 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/malpractice_ survey.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2013) (listing a collection of articles related to each state‘s claims and 
defenses related to legal malpractice cases). 
54
 Joshua C. Vincent & Paul D. Swanson, It‘s Only Ethical: A Uniformity Argument for 
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Patent Legal Malpractice Claims, 5 LANDSLIDE 50 
(2013). 
55
 See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d 
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (patent litigation malpractice); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & 
Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (patent prosecution malpractice).  
56
 See Air Measurement Techs., 504 F.3d 1262; Immunocept, 504 F.3d 1281. Joshua C. 
Vincent & Paul D. Swanson, It‘s Only Ethical: A Uniformity Argument for Exclusive 
Federal Jurisdiction over Patent Legal Malpractice Claims, 5 LANDSLIDE 50 (2013). 
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Circuit had held that any state law claim that required application of patent 
law was subject to federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.57  
 In Gunn v. Minton, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
precedent and returned authority to the state courts.
 58 
Gunn, a patent 
litigation malpractice case, presented a divisive jurisdictional issue: whether 
state tort-law based professional malpractice claims stemming from federal 
patent infringement litigation should be brought in state or federal courts.
59
  
The Texas Supreme Court held the patent issue involved a substantial 
element of the malpractice claim and thus was beyond the jurisdiction of state 
courts.
60
  The Supreme Court reversed and unanimously held that state law 
patent legal malpractice claims presumptively belonged in state court.
61
  
 Gunn asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s 
precedent from the Federal Circuit’s 2007 decisions in Air Measurement 
Technologies (patent litigation malpractice) and Immunocept (patent 
prosecution malpractice).
62
  The Supreme Court held that a state law claim 
alleging legal malpractice in the handling of a patent case did not “arise 
under” federal patent law, and thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) did not deprive the 
state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
63
  
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
ruled on a business tort claim brought by the waste-treatment business 
                                                 
57
 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1791, 1805 (2013). 
58
 Joshua C. Vincent & Paul D. Swanson, It‘s Only Ethical: A Uniformity Argument for 





 Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
61
 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
62
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Forrester against competitor Wheelabrator.
64
  Wheelabrator removed the state 
law action to federal court, arguing that Forrester’s claims implicated a 
substantial question of U.S. patent law.
65
  The central issue on appeal was 
whether Forrester’s state law claims necessarily raised a “substantial 
question” of federal patent law, such that the district court had original 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 over Forrester’s claims.66  Wheelabrator 
argued federal subject matter jurisdiction
67
 existed because Forrester could 
only recover if Forrester prevailed on a “substantial question”68 of U.S. 
patent law.
69
  Specifically, Wheelabrator argued that because Forrester 
sought relief based upon allegations that Wheelabrator had made a false 
statement about a U.S. patent, “such allegations necessarily required the trial 
court to construe the claims of the patent in order to determine whether the 
alleged statements were false”.70  Thus, Forrester’s claims raised a substantial 
question of federal patent law.
71
   
Forrester responded that federal subject matter jurisdiction did not 
exist by reason of the relief he sought.
72
  Forrester’s claims were based upon 
statements allegedly made by Wheelabrator to the Taiwanese customer 
Kobin that Wheelabrator’s patents covered the process that Kobin licensed 
from Forrester.
73
  However, Forrester argued that he did not claim patent 
                                                 
64
 Forrester Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329 
(2013).   
65
 Id. at 1332. 
66
 Id. at 1333.   
67
 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction over “any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents“). 
68
 See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) 
(holding where the federal patent law does not create the cause of action, subject-matter 
jurisdiction may still lie if “plaintiff‘s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a 
substantial question of federal patent law.“); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) 
(holding federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie where a federal issue is 
necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court 
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress).   
69
 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1332. 
70
 Brief for Appellee at 30, Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334. 
71
 Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. at 808–09. 
72
 Supp. Brief for Appellant at 2, Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1329. 
73
 Forrester Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 
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infringement or raise any other substantial question of patent law.
74
  Forrester 
also argued that Wheelabrator’s allegedly inaccurate statements regarding its 
patent rights concerned conduct taking place entirely in Taiwan.
75
  Because 
“Kobin’s extra-territorial practice of a method allegedly covered by 
Forrester’s patents is not protected by U.S. patent law,” Forrester argued 
there was no need for any fact finder to construe those Forrester patents.
76
   
In deciding whether Forrester’s state law claims raised a substantial 
question of federal patent law, the Federal Circuit applied the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Gunn.77  The Federal Circuit stated it had previously held 
similar state law claims premised on allegedly false statements about patents 
raised a substantial question of federal patent law, and that “[t]hose cases 
may well have survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn.”78  The 
Federal Circuit distinguished Gunn,  and held that the legal malpractice claim 
did not involve a substantial question of patent law
79
 from two Federal 
Circuit decisions that disparagement claims for false statements about U.S. 
patent rights did involve substantial questions of patent law.
80
  The court 
explained that if decided under state law, the disparagement claims “could 
result in inconsistent judgments between state and federal courts,” whereas 
the legal malpractice claim was “purely ‘backward looking.’”81  The Federal 
Circuit expressed concern that permitting state courts to adjudicate 
disparagement cases (involving alleged false statements about U.S. patent 
rights) could result in inconsistent judgments between state and federal 
                                                                                                                         
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
74
 Supp. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 2. 
75
 Brief for Appellee, supra note 7, at 1-2. 
76
 Id.  
77
 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334 (citing Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013)). 
78
 Id.  
79
 Id. at 1334 (citing Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1066-67). 
80
 Forrester, at 1334 (citing Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. 
Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478 (Fed.Cir. 1993) and Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic 
Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., 
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed.Cir. 1999) (en banc)). 
81
 Id. (quoting Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1066-67).  
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  “For example, a federal court could conclude that certain conduct 
constituted infringement of a patent while a state court addressing the same 
infringement question could conclude that the accusation of infringement was 
false and the patentee could be enjoined from making future public claims 
about the full scope of its patent as construed in federal court.”83   
The Federal Circuit concluded that the instant case did not give rise to 
the possibility of future conflict.
84
  First, the court relied on the fact that the 
allegedly inaccurate statements concerned conduct taking place entirely in 
Taiwan.
85
  “Those statements did not concern activities that could infringe 
U.S. patent rights, and it is not entirely clear why the Taiwanese entities in 
this case cared about the extent of Wheelabrator’s U.S. patent rights.”86  The 
court concluded, “[T]here is no prospect of a future U.S. infringement suit 
arising out of Kobin’s use of WES-PHix® or FESI-BOND in Taiwan, and 
accordingly no prospect of inconsistent judgments between state and federal 
courts.”87   
Second, the Federal Circuit reasoned there was no concrete evidence 
of U.S. patent rights being implicated in the claim because the patents at 
issue had all expired at the time of judgment.
88
  The court noted that for the 
three patents that had already expired there was no prospect of future conduct 
in the U.S. that could lead to an infringement suit.
89
  Because there was no 
prospect of a future U.S. infringement suit arising out of Kobin’s conduct in 
Taiwan, there was no prospect of inconsistent judgments between state and 
federal courts.
90
  As the alleged acts occurred outside the U.S., and did not 

















 Id. (stating “the ‘356, ‘233, and ‘114 patents have all now expired, so there is also no 
prospect that future conduct in the U.S. could lead to an infringement suit regarding those 
patents“). See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1338(a), 1441(a). 
90
 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335. 
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concern activities that could infringe U.S. patent rights, the court found that, 
as in Gunn, any potential federal-state conflict in the instant case was “purely 
‘hypothetical.’”91   
The next question was whether the doctrine of federal preemption 
applied to Forrester’s claims.  Wheelabrator argued resolution of the claim 
construction issues would have a potential preclusive effect in future 
litigation that involved the patents.
92
  In rejecting this argument, the Federal 
Circuit court noted the Supreme Court’s rejection of a related argument in 
Gunn because any such collateral estoppel effect “would be limited to the 
parties and patents that had been before the state court,” and “such fact-
bound and situation-specific effects are not sufficient to establish federal 
‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”93  
The court also rejected Wheelabrator’s argument that Forrester sought 
remedies that might be preempted by federal law.
94
  The appellate court 
pointed out that federal preemption is ordinarily a defense that does not 
appear on the face of the complaint, and therefore did not authorize removal 
to federal court.
95
  Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
Wheelabrator’s jurisdictional arguments were without merit and even if the 
allegations contained in Forrester’s complaint necessarily raised a question of 
patent law, the patent law issues are not ‘substantial in the relevant sense’ 
under Gunn.
96
   
Concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment on Forrester’s tort law claims involving questions of 
                                                 
91
 Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1067 (2013)). 
92
 Supp. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 2, as quoted in Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335. 
93
 Id. (quoting Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1067–68) (internal citations omitted). 
94
 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335. 
95
 Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 
L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)). 
96
 Id. at 1336 (quoting Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1066). 
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patent law, and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand the 
case to New Hampshire state court.
97
  
V.  COMMENT 
THE PROBLEM WITH PATENT TROLLS 
Patent trolls or NPEs are non-manufacturing patent owners (either 
individuals or companies) that purchase patents and assert them with no 
intention of creating or manufacturing a product using the patented 
technology.
98
  Because NPEs do not practice the patented invention nor 
produce any products, they are never infringers.
99
  Generally, NPEs profit by 
alleging infringement and offering to license their patents to the alleged 
infringer in exchange for a royalty much lower than the alleged infringer 
would pay defending a claim of patent infringement.
100
  NPEs may threaten 
                                                 
97
 Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1331 
(Fed. Cir.  2013). 
98
 David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant 
Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, 7 (2005). See gen. Todd Klein, Ebay v. 
Mercexchange and Ksr Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Wages War Against 
Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 314 (2007). Cf. Jaconda Wagnera,  
Patent trolls and the high cost of litigation to business and start-ups – a myth? Maryland 
Bar Journal, 45-OCT Md. B.J. 12 (Sept./Oct. 2012) (noting “the term ‘patent troll’ is a 
pejorative applied to an entity that does not manufacture products but owns or controls 
patents that it enforces against manufacturing entities to make money“).  
99
 See Rita Heimes, Director of Center for Law and Innovation, University of Maine 
School of Law, Patent Trolls Prey On SMEs, THE RECORDER (Jul. 30, 2001) at 5, available 
at 
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/cli/documents/Patent_Trolls.PDF#search=‘patent%20trolls%C20
prey%CC20on%S̈MEs‘. See Terrence P. McMahon, Stephen J. Akerley & Jane H. Bu, Who 
Is A Troll? Not A Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 168 (2006). 
100
 David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant 
Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, 7 (2005). See Danielle Williams & Steven Gardner, 
Basic Framework for Effective Responses to Patent Trolls, IP LINKS, Apr. 2006, at 1, 
available at 
http://intellectualproperty.ncbar.org/Newsletter/Newsletters/Downloads_GetFile.aspx?id=59
56 (noting “business model[s]“ according to which a patent holder “seeks licensing fees of 
$30,000-$100,000 from each of hundreds of targets“ or “fees of $200,000-$750,000 from a 
smaller number of companies“).  
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costly and time-consuming litigation
101
 against both small and large 
companies.
102
 Because companies want to avoid litigation and the possibility 
of a subsequent permanent injunction, such tactics allow NPEs to generate 
large amounts of revenue through licensing.
103
 
Unfortunately, litigation is one of the most effective mechanisms for 
eliminating NPEs.
104
  “[A] patent owner who unsuccessfully sues an alleged 
infringer may incur substantial losses if a court also holds that the patent is 
invalid.”105  Given this risk, litigation allows a threatened infringer to “turn 
the tables on the patentee and threaten the NPE’s own assets- possibly 
driving the value of the litigation to the infringer below zero”.106  However, 
                                                 
101
 “Even if a patent-infringement suit would be relatively strong, a litigation-wary 
patent owner may deliberately pursue a business strategy according to which it seeks to 
license its patent to multiple firms for significantly less than $1 million each--in other words, 
for less than it would likely cost to litigate any disputes over infringement or validity.“ John 
M. Golden, “Patent Trolls“ and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2161 (2007) 
(noting litigation costs (including attorneys’ fees) could also be the primary drivers for 
settlements). See Danielle Williams & Steven Gardner, Basic Framework for Effective 
Responses to Patent Trolls, IP LINKS, Apr. 2006, at 1, 3, available at 
http://intellectualproperty.ncbar.org/Newsletter/Newsletters/Downloads_ 
GetFile.aspx? id=5956 (noting “business model[s]“ according to which a patent holder 
“seeks licensing fees of $30,000-$100,000 from each of hundreds of targets“ or “fees of 
$200,000-$750,000 from a smaller number of companies“). 
102
 See Bessen & Meurer, supra at n. 1 (showing small and medium-sized entities made 
up 90% of the companies sued, accounted for 59% of the defenses, and paid about 37% of 
the aggregate costs in 2011). See also Alex S. Li, Accidentally on Target: The Mstg Effects 
on Non-Practicing Entities‘ Litigation and Settlement Strategies, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 




 Williams & Gardner, supra note 99, at 1 (“Often, an effective response to a patent 
troll is one that increases its uncertainty, doubt, and fear such that the patent troll concludes 
that the best business decision is to end the accusation or to resolve the accusation with terms 
favorable to the accused company.“). 
105
 See William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: 
Some Preliminary Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 756 (2004) 
106
 Compare Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy 
Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 183, 190 
(“Through litigation, a threatened infringer can turn the tables on the patentee and threaten 
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smaller companies or inventors rarely have the resources required for 
litigation against NPEs.
107
  Even after an injunction is issued, a party’s 
relative size and resources may provide an advantage in negotiations.
108
 
However, if the alleged infringer “pays royalties or quits selling the product, 
the patent holder gets the benefit of a successful lawsuit without the risk of 
losing the lawsuit.”109  
PATENT TROLLING & ENVIRONMENTALLY-BENEFICIAL TECHNOLOGY 
Intellectual property rights are a necessary incentive for investment in 
development of sustainable technologies.
110
 Patent trolling is particularly 
problematic when it affects patents that are environmentally beneficial.
111
 For 
                                                                                                                         
the patent troll‘s own assets--possibly driving the value of the litigation to the infringer 
below zero.“). But cf. Rantanen at  n.134 (discussing situations in which “a patentee‘s 
discovery costs may equal--or exceed--those of the infringer,“ but acknowledging that such 
situations would be unlikely to occur if a patentee had already successfully defended the 
validity of its patent in litigation). 
107
 See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls“ and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 
2161 (2007); Leslie T. Grab, Equitable Concerns of eBay v. MercExchange: Did the 
Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 81, 113 (2006) (“For many small, independent inventors, litigation is not an option.“); 
Mann, supra note 1, at 981 (“[E]ven if an early-stage company had a patent, it is unlikely that 
it would have resources available to enforce the patent through litigation against a 
competitor.“).  
108
 Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary 
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 600 (2001) (concluding, based on a study of twelve cases 
in which courts issued preliminary injunctions, that larger firms “hold out longer in 
settlement negotiations after they have been enjoined“). 
109
 Douglas Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 523 (3d 
ed. 2002). 
110
  See Janet S. Hendrickson, Is the Big Blue Marble Getting Greener?, 4.1 LANDSLIDE 
No. 1, Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 20, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/landslide_september_20
11/behnen_land 
slide_septoct_2011.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that in patenting rates for various clean energy 
technologies (CETs) or green technologies, the rate of increase per year is about 20%).  
111
 See MaCharri R. Vorndran-Jones, Green Technology: A Way of Thinking or Stalled 
at the Starting Line? 4  LANDSLIDE No. 1, Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 9, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
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example, the patents at issue in Forrester were phosphate-based treatment 
systems for stabilizing heavy metals in municipal and industrial waste.
112
  
These systems prevent heavy metals from potentially leaching into sources of 
drinking water.
113
 Pollution prevention technologies reduce or eliminate the 
environmental degradation that accompanies industrial activities.
114
 Patents 




The purpose of patent law is to promote progress, “a promising 
premise for the goal of incentivizing environmental innovation.”116 Some 
commentators assert that intellectual property has had a neutral impact on the 
environment.
117
 Others have argued that the patent system fails to provide 
sufficient incentive for innovation in environmentally beneficial 
technologies.
118
 In the context of environmental innovation, the benefits 
                                                                                                                         
landslide/landslide_september_2011/behnen_landslide_septoct_2011.authcheckdam.pdf 
(“Some small business and independent inventors submit that the current U.S. patent and 
legal system, with broad pioneer patents and litigious patent owners (including nonpracticing 
patentees, sometimes referred to as “patent trolls“) instead present a daunting challenge to 
the independent creation of new green technologies“). 
112
 Forrester Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 




 Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons: A Donation Approach Encouraging 
Innovation Within the Patent System, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 659, 662-74 
(2011) (arguing industry occupies a unique position in environmental issues because of the 
tension between its contribution to the harm of the environment and its role in reducing the 
use of resources and pollution). 
115
 See Michael A. Gollin, Patent Law and the Environment/Technology Paradox, 20 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10171 (1990) (hereafter “Patent Law”). 
116
 Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property 
Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 54 
(2005). 
117
 Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 
4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 195-96 (1991) (hereafter “Using Intellectual Property”). 
118
 See Mandel, supra n. 116 at 56.  
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conferred by patents may not outweigh the high cost of obtaining and 
protecting them,
119
 nor the exclusivity problems presented by patent trolls.
120
  
Environmental technology includes: (1) industrial processes that 
minimize resource consumption and waste production, (2) consumer products 
that are environmentally benign throughout their life cycles, (3) recycling 
equipment and processes, (4) waste management technologies for solid and 
hazardous waste, (5) pollution control devices, and (6) products and methods 
for cleaning up pollution.
121
  Environmental technology can reduce costs of 
materials, costs of production, as well as increase rates of production, and the 
attractiveness of products in the marketplace.
122
 
Many commentators contend there is potential for socially beneficial 
environmental innovation that should be, but is not, occurring.
123
 The U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) does not discriminate against 
inventions that could be seen as detrimental to society or of little worth.
124
 
The PTO’s failure to discriminate between environmentally harmful and 
beneficial technologies may have a substantively negative impact on 
innovation.
125
 “The patent system is a measure of innovation.”126 As the total 
                                                 
119
 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on The Invisible Hand: How Intellectual 
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 405, 436 (2008). 
120
 See Patent Thickets, Bad Patents, and Costly Patent Litigation, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY, (May 6, 2009, 11:56 PM), http:// volokh.com/author/guestblogger/. 
121
 See Gollin, Patent Law, supra n. 115. 
122
 See Gollin, Using Intellectual Property, supra n. 117. 
123
 See Mandel, supra n. 116 at  69. 
124
 See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“To be sure, since Justice Story‘s opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1817), it has been stated that inventions that are ‘injurious to the well-being, good policy, or 
sound morals of society’ are unpatentable... [But this principle] has not been applied broadly 
in recent years.... As the Supreme Court put the point more generally, ‘Congress never 
intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by that 
term those powers by which the health, good order, peace and general warfare of the 
community are promoted.“). 
125
 See Gollin, Using Intellectual Property, supra n. 117 at 235 (encouraging an 
environmental perspective on patents to distinguish between harmful and beneficial 
technologies, discouraging the former while encouraging the latter.) See Gray, The Paradox 
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number of patent actions has increased,
127
 so have the number of patents filed 
for renewable energy.
128
 Environmentally beneficial technology is a public 
good.
129
  However, environmental innovation suffers two public good 
problems - an invention public good problem and an environmental public 
good problem.
130
 The PTO’s failure to discriminate between environmentally 
beneficial and harmful technologies may represent a failure to meaningfully 
prioritize socially valuable patents.
131
 Environmental innovation requires 
large-scale capital investment, particularly in regard to green innovation.
132
 
                                                                                                                         
of Technological Development, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 192 (Ausubel & 
Sladovich eds. 1989) (The paradox of technology is that while technological development 
can create opportunities for improving the environment, it can also disrupt and harm the 
environment. By distinguishing between harmful and beneficial technology, the paradox can 
be resolved.). 
126
 See Gollin, Using Intellectual Property, supra n. 117 at 232 fn. 182. 
127
 PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011 Patent Litigation Study: Patent litigation trends as 
the “America Invents Act“ becomes law, at 8 (2011). 
128
 Luı´s M. A. Bettencourt, Jessika E. Trancik, & Jasleen Kaur, Determinants of the 
Pace of Global Innovation in Energy Technologies (Oct. 14, 2013), available at 
http://trancik.scripts.mit.edu/home/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/plos_patents_final_submission_w_HEADER (showing a sharp 
increase in rates of patenting over the last decade, particularly in renewable technologies, 
despite continued low levels of R&D funding, and revealing a regular relationship between 
growing markets and public R&D in driving innovative activity.). 
129
 Mandel, supra n. 116 at 57-58 (“Implementation of environmental innovation that 
reduces pollution, improves remediation, enhances conservation, or otherwise provides 
environmental benefit has substantial salutary effects for many members of society…“). See 
Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons: A Donation Approach Encouraging Innovation 
Within the Patent System, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 659, 662-74 (2011). 
130
 See Fred Bosselman et al., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 41-44 
(2000) (describing the role of externalities in environmental protection and discussing the 
public good aspect of environmental protection); Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the 
Mother of Innovation: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 LAW AND POLICY 348 (2005) (noting 
that industry tends to under-invest in “environmental technologies because of their public 
good characteristic“). 
131
 Sarah Tran, Prioritizing Innovation, 30 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 499, 531-32 (2012). 
132
 See Daniel Gross, The Real “Green” Innovation, SLATE.COM (April 16, 2009, 6:57 
AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2216129/. 
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Patents provide little incentive to innovate if it is difficult to recover costs or 
the innovation is likely to lead to costly litigation.
133
  
FORRESTER ENCOURAGES A RESPONSE BY STATES 
Patent law has traditionally been the federal government’s domain. 134  
However, patent trolling is a national problem, and Forrester demonstrates 
that NPE-related litigation is becoming an increasing nuisance for state 
officials.  The practical effect of Forrester is to encourage state attorneys 
general to protect businesses from abusive lawsuits filed by NPEs. 
In May 2013, Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell filed a state 
action against MPHJ Technology Investments in the State of Vermont 
Superior Court, claiming that MPHJ had violated Vermont consumer 
protection laws.
135
  The Vermont AG brought the claims under Section 
2453(a) of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”),136 which 
prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in commerce.
137
 Passed to 
help Vermont businesses protect themselves from bad faith patent 
infringement claims,
138
 the VCPA was the first “patent troll” legislation in 
Vermont, and thus far, is the only one of its kind in the nation.
139
 
This suit marked the first time that a state attorney general has filed 
suit against a “patent troll”.  The suit was filed after hundreds of Vermont 
businesses
140
 received demand letters from various patent-holding 
                                                 
133
 See Derzko, supra n. 40 at 8. 
134
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
135
 Complaint at 3, Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, No. 282-5-13 
WNCV (Va. Super. Ct. May 8, 2013). 
136
 Vermont Consumer Protection Act, 9 V.S.A. §§4195-4199 (effective July 1, 2013) 
(hereafter the “VCPA“).  
137
 Id. at § 2453(a). 
138




 The businesses included two small non-profits who were named in the complaint: 
Lincoln Street, a Springfield nonprofit that gives home care to developmentally disabled 
Vermonters, and ARIS Solutions, a non-profit that helps the disabled and their caregivers 
with various fiscal and payroll services. Complaint at 3, Vermont v. MPHJ Technology 
 





 MPHJ Technology claims to have a patent on the process of 
scanning documents and attaching them to email via a network.
142
 The 
demand letters generally stated that using office equipment-like scanners that 
send email files-violates patents owned by MPHJ Technologies.
143
 Usually 
the letters demanded a payment of $9,000, or be faced with legal action.
144
 
After Vermont filed suit, MPHJ Technologies attempted to remove the action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, 
as opposed to the State of Vermont Superior Court.
145
  
 Other states have taken an interest as well.  Recently, Minnesota settled 
patent litigation against MPHJ.
146
 The Nebraska Attorney General is also 
investigating MPHJ for sending numerous demand letters claiming federal patent 
violations had been perpetrated by any Nebraska consumer, small business or 
nonprofit that had ever used a scanner to send files to email.
147
  Nebraska is the 
                                                                                                                         
Investments, LLC, No. 282-5-13 WNCV (Va. Super. Ct. May 8, 2013). 
141
  Joe Mullin, Patent troll that wants $1,000 per worker gets sued by Vermont A-G, 
Ars Technica (May 22, 2013 1:40 PM CDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/05/patent-troll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/. 
142
 Press Release, Vermont Attorney General, Vermont Attorney General Sues “Patent 




 Joe Mullin, Patent troll that wants $1,000 per worker gets sued by Vermont A-G, Ars 
Technica (May 22, 2013 1:40 PM CDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/patent-
troll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/. 
144
  Joe Mullin, Patent troll that wants $1,000 per worker gets sued by Vermont A-G, 
Ars Technica (May 22, 2013 1:40 PM CDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/05/patent-troll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/. 
145
 Notice of Removal at 8, Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, U.S. 
District Court for the District of Vermont, Docket No. 2:13-CV-00170-wks (June 7, 2013 
3:36 PM) (seeking to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, 
as opposed to the State of Vermont Superior Court). 
146
 See Jennifer Bjorhus, Minnesota targets East Coast ‘patent troll‘, STAR TRIBUNE 
(Aug. 27, 2013 9:20 AM), http://www.startribune.com/business/220375171.html (noting 
Minnesota is the first state in the U.S. to settle with a patent troll). 
147
 Press Release, Attorney Gen. Jon Bruning, Patent Troll Action Won’t Deter 
Nebraska Investigation, NEB. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1108773z35296d9f/_fn/100913%25Patent 
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second state whose officials are attempting to shield local businesses from 
frivolous lawsuits by patent holders through state laws.  In July 2013, the 
Nebraska Attorney General
148
 initiated an investigation into whether patent 
infringement enforcement efforts by a Texas law firm, Farney Daniels LLP, 





  The firm had sent multiple demand letters to Nebraska 




The Federal Circuit expressed concern over uniformity in Forrester, 
fearing that permitting state courts to adjudicate claims that involved alleged 
false statements about U.S. patent rights could result in inconsistent 
judgments between state and federal courts.
153
  However, the holding in 
Forrester makes it more difficult to remove a patent-related action grounded 
in state law.  This difficulty follows a trend set by the recently enacted 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), which overhauled the U.S. 
patent laws.
154
 The AIA responded to concerns about patent trolls by enacting 
                                                                                                                         
TrollWontDeterInvestigation.pdf. 
148
 See Timothy B. Lee, How Vermont could save the nation from patent trolls, THE 
WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2013 10:05 AM), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/01/how-vermont-could-save-
the-nation-from-patent-trolls/ (stating Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning credits 
Vermont attorney general William Sorrell for drawing his attention to the problem). 
149
 Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 59-1601, 1602 et seq. 
(Reissue 2010, Supp. 2012). 
150
 Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-301.01 et seq. 
(Reissue 2008, Supp. 2010). 
151
 See Press Release, Jon Bruning, Attorney General Bruning Investigating “Patent 
Trolls“, NEB. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 13, 2013), 
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1069520z2e735d6e/_fn/071813+Bruning+Patent
+ 
Troll+Release+.pd. See also Letter from Jon Bruning, Nebraska Attorney Gen., to M. Brett 








 David Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for IP and Director of the USPTO. 
 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1 
329 
 
a more restrictive joinder rule.  This rule was intended to make it more 
difficult for NPEs to file suit and to help reduce the strain on judicial 
resources.
155
 The holding in Forrester may encourage state action against 
NPEs like MPHJ, freeing up the federal courts for claims that are 
substantially related to patents.  Moreover, because the audience most 
commonly affected by NPEs is both small and large business owners,
156
 the 
Forrester decision provides some support for states to use their own state law 
to protect their citizens from abusive lawsuits.  This may stem the tide of 
NPE-filed litigation, which is steadily building into a crisis. 
One increasing problem is NPEs who assert weak or expired 
patents.
157
 For example, the litigation in Forrester arose from expired 
patents.
158
  Forrester also paves the way for states to resolve ancillary 
questions of patent law while protecting small and large business owners.  
The Forrester holding creates a precedent for states to bring actions against 
NPEs who invoke rights to expired patents.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
By making it more difficult to remove a patent-related action 
grounded in state law, the Forrester decision may lessen the sting of non-
practicing entity (“NPE”)-related litigation.  Forrester also encourages state 
attorneys general to attack patent trolls on their own ground, using state law 
to protect businesses.  Lastly, Forrester represents a positive first step for 
states to resolve suits that involve patent claims on environmentally 
beneficial technology.   
                                                                                                                         
Building the Innovation Revolution. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE. (Jan. 
30, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kappos_PCAST.jsp (most sweeping 
overhaul of the patent laws in 175 years). 
155
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 19(d), §299, 125 Stat. 
284, 332-33 (2011).  
156
 See Bessen & Meurer, supra at n. 5. 
157
 Joel B. Cartera, Responding to a Patent Troll’s Threats, 48 ARK. LAW., Summer 
2013, at 30. 
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 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Moreover, the ′356, ′ 233, and ′114 
patents have all now expired…“). 
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